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NOTES AND NEWS

PRIZE IN PSYCHOPHYSICS

A PRIZE of one hundred dollars (\$100) is offered for the best paper on the Availability of Pearson's Formulæ for Psychophysics.

The rules for the solution of this problem have been formulated in general terms by William Brown. It is now required (1) to make their formulation specific, and (2) to show how they work out in actual practise. This means that the writer must show the steps to be taken in the treatment of a complete set of data (Vollreihe) for the attainment in every case of a definite result. The calculations should be arranged with a view to practical application, i. e., so that the amount of computation is reduced to a minimum. If the labor of computation can be reduced by new tables, this fact should be pointed out.

The paper must contain samples of numerical calculation; but it is not necessary that the writer have experimental data of his own. In default of new data, those of F. M. Urban's experiments on lifted weights (all seven observers) or those of H. Keller's accumetrical experiments (all results of one observer in both time-orders) are to be used.

Papers in competition for this prize will be received, not later than December 31, 1914, by Professor E. B. Titchener, Cornell Heights, Ithaca, N. Y., U. S. A. Such papers are to be marked only with a motto, and are to be accompanied by a sealed envelope, marked with the same motto, and containing the name and address of the writer. The prize will be awarded by a committee consisting of Professors William Brown, E. B. Titchener, and F. M. Urban.

The committee will make known the name of the successful competitor on July 1, 1915. The unsuccessful papers, with the corresponding envelopes, will be destroyed (unless called for by their authors) six months after the publication of the award.

A MEETING of the Aristotelian Society was held on November 3. The president delivered the inaugural address on "Appearance and Real Existence." Since the publication of Mr. Bradley's great work in 1893, no distinction has been more readily pressed into service as a means of making headway in metaphysical construction than the distinction between appear-Anything which comes short when compared with ance and reality. reality is called by him "appearance," meaning thereby not that the thing always is itself an appearance, but that its character becomes an appearance in any judgment we make concerning it. Reality being conceived as the single absolute experience, immanent in finite centers of feeling, but never wholly included in any one finite center, it follows that the contents of a finite subject's experience will point beyond themselves, and will come to have for knowledge a meaning, this meaning being used as an idea, as an adjective qualifying that which is other than its own being. In later treatments of metaphysical problems we find the term "appearance," or equivalent expressions, freely used, but without any effort to make explicit and unmistakable the exact sense in which it is to be understood. The way in which phenomena or appearances have been treated in three great metaphysical systems—the Platonic, the Kantian, and the Hegelian—was then considered at some length. In all of them existence, in one form or another, is described to phenomena or The important question is whether the concrete particular things of the realm of existence are rightly described as phenomena or The former are in no sense mental constructions. secondary qualities of things are not explicable as creations of the mind. If we keep rigorously to the significance of phenomena in which the subjective characteristic is the more prominent, they are not existing Their mode of being is similar in kind to that assigned to entities. universals.—Athenœum.